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This article looks at a less discussed topic in European legal scholarship: the horizontal 
direct effect of EU international agreements and the Court of Justice’s apparent reluctance 
to expressly confirm it. It is argued that the direct effect of EU international agreements has 
been confirmed in proceedings involving private individuals/professionals against the private 
regulatory bodies of a profession or a State owned and controlled entity. However, direct 
effect has not yet been expressly confirmed in cases involving veritable horizontal 
relationships, between private parties of equal positions and with equal functions. Whilst, the 
choice for this reluctance was understandable three decades ago, the time feels right to 


















I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the process of defining the relationship between EU law and Member State law, the ‘direct 
effect’ of EU norms took centre stage and it soon became obvious that two major factors have an 
influence on the direct effect outcome.
1
 First, the Court differentiates between the direct effect of 
the Founding Treaties, general principles, regulations, directives and decisions. Therefore, the type 
of EU legal instrument being invoked is essential to the direct effect analysis. The second factor the 
Court takes into consideration is the nature of the party against whom the EU rule is being invoked. 
This results in the difference between vertical and horizontal direct effect (hereinafter ‘HDE’) and 
an area of law with ‘diminishing coherence’,
2
 with a special focus on the lack of HDE of directives. 
Whilst the direct effect of EU international agreements which are binding
3
 on the EU (EU 
international agreements) is subject to abundant and novel legal literature,
4
 there is less focus on 
their application in proceedings between private parties. Such a choice is understandable as most 
contentious issues, such as the lack of direct effect of the GATT/WTO, the Ankara Agreement, the 
UNCLOS and the Aarhus Convention arose in vertical proceedings involving private parties and 
Member States or EU institutions. Cases which involve reliance on international agreements by a 
private party against another private party are fairly rare
5
 and less discussed in legal literature.
6
 
Given the increasing number of legal relationships governed by international agreements, the 
traditional view according to which international agreements only create rights and obligations for 
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the contracting parties is rapidly changing. Private parties in the EU need to be given a clear answer 
whether it is possible for them to have rights under international agreements, which they can 
enforce against other private parties and whether they are also liable to carry out certain 
international obligations for the benefit of other private parties.   
With this in mind, the present article focuses on two major issues.  First, it has to be seen how 
the afore-mentioned two factors, the type of legal instrument and the party against whom the 
international norm is invoked, influence the enforcement of international agreements in proceedings 
between private parties. Second, building on these findings, it is then necessary to take a closer look 
at the reasons behind the Court’s reluctance to expressly confirm the HDE of international 
agreements and whether such reluctance is understandable. The article will refer to ‘veritable/true’ 
horizontal relationships in order to describe proceedings between private parties, which occupy 
similar levels of hierarchy and do not exercise State-like or regulatory powers.   
In order to answer the first question, Part II shall first look at how the HDE of international 
agreements can be influenced by the international origin of such agreements. It then provides a 
thorough analysis of the existing cases in which private parties have relied on international 
agreements against each other. As shall be seen, it is not always readily discernible whether HDE 
has occurred.  Based on these findings, Part III will then focus on the second question, the apparent 
reluctance of the Court to openly acknowledge the HDE of international agreements. This part will 
also provide examples of how other major jurisdictions apply international agreements in 
proceedings between private parties in order to prove that the Court should not hesitate to expressly 
acknowledge the HDE of EU international agreements. Part IV is meant for conclusions. 
  
II. THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE HDE OF EU INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
 
The type of legal instrument containing the legal norm and the party against whom the legal norm is 
invoked are just as important when the direct effect of EU international agreements in the 
EU/Member State legal orders is concerned. First, even though agreements which are binding on 
the EU form an “integral part” of the EU legal order
7
 and have primacy over secondary EU 
legislation and Member State laws,
8
 the Court takes into consideration their “international origin” 
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when granting them effects.
9
 This ‘outside’ origin can explain why the conditions needed for the 
direct effect of EU norms may not always apply to international agreements
10
 and why the Court is 
known to favour domestic policy concerns over the EU’s international obligations.
11
 Second, 
international agreements create inter-State, private party-State (vertical) and private party-private 
party (horizontal) relationships.
12
 Recent research has shown that domestic courts are more willing 
to directly apply treaty provisions that regulate relationships between private actors,
 13
 such as those 
found in the Montreal Convention or the Warsaw Convention, because they do not create 
significant new duties for governments. However, they are less willing to do so when international 
agreements regulate vertical situations, because such agreements implicate the public functions of 
government.
14
 Therefore, the nature of the parties involved in the proceedings and the obligations 
arising under the agreement are also crucial to the HDE analysis. 
 
1. The First Factor: EU International Agreements as a Source of EU Rights and Obligations 
 
Some authors argue that EU international agreements can either be applied without the need of any 
further implementing measures, just as regulations, or with subsequent implementing measures, the 
method of which is left to the contracting parties, just as in the case of directives.
15
 With this in 
mind, one might be inclined to draw a parallel between the HDE of directives and the possible HDE 
of international agreements. However, such parallels should be handled with caution.  
First, international agreements do not appear under Article 288 TFEU as acts enacted by the 
EU institutions. Whilst it is true that international agreements are concluded by the Council through 
decisions, which are acts of an EU institution, the agreements themselves are the result of 
international negotiations with other States or international organisations and are not adopted 
through the internal EU legislative procedures. As mentioned, even if the Court considers 
international agreements to be an ‘integral part’ of EU law, it will take into consideration their 
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‘international origin’ when granting them direct effect. Second, Article 288 TFEU differentiates 
between the ‘direct applicability’ of regulations and the obligation of Member States to transpose 
directives in their legal orders. On the other hand, Article 216(2) TFEU only refers to the binding 
character of EU international agreements, but is silent on their application within the EU and 
Member States’ legal orders. This gives the Court more freedom to decide whether an international 
agreement is capable of direct application, as there are no constraints such as the ones faced by 
directives under Article 288 TFEU. Third, it is known that the Court allows for the vertical direct 
effect of directives in cases of incorrect or non-implementation, even if directives are not directly 
applicable in the Member State legal orders. On the other hand, if the Court decides that by its 
nature and structure an international agreement is not capable of direct application, neither vertical 
nor horizontal direct effect is possible.
16
 Fourth, directives lay down a period in which Member 
States have to implement them and bring their legislation in conformity with the directive. Due to 
this temporal element, a private party has the right to rely on a directive against the Member State 
only if the deadline for implementation of the directive has passed and the Member State did not 
implement the directive.
17 
On the other hand, in general, no temporal factor is attached to the 
enforcement of international agreements and contracting parties will rarely include anything about 
their domestic application. One exception is the Ankara Agreement, the objectives of which were 
meant to be achieved in several stages.
18
  
Turning back to more pertinent issues, it must be remembered that the HDE debate of 
directives had as its starting the difference Article 288 TFEU makes between the general and direct 
application of regulations and the obligation of Member States to transpose directives. From this, it 
followed that directives could not impose obligations directly on individuals,
19
 but they could do so 
indirectly through the means of the national implementing legislation. It also means that there are 
two sets of obligations that need to be differentiated when applying a ‘foreign’ norm to internal 
horizontal situations. The first type of obligation refers to the duty of the domestic authorities to 
transpose the ‘foreign’ norm into their legal order. The second type of obligation refers to the duties 
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a. The obligation to ‘transpose’  
 
The obligation to transpose the ‘outside’ norm into the internal legal order is envisaged by 
Article 288 TFEU for directives, but is not included in Article 216(2) TFEU. According to the 
Court, EU international agreements form an ‘integral part’ of the EU legal order, without the need 
of transposing measures. In other words, there is no general primary EU law obligation for the EU 
institutions or the Member States to transpose EU international agreements into their legal orders. 
Generally, EU international agreements should be capable of direct enforcement by the judiciary. 
However, the Court’s case-law does not always point in this direction. 
In order to prove the direct effect of international agreements several external and internal 
restrictions need to be passed. First, the EU has to be bound by the agreement.
20
 Second, the 
agreement must form an integral part of EU law. Third, if the parties have not decided on the 
effects, it is up to the Court to decide on the effects of the agreement.
21
 Once the Court is satisfied 
with these external conditions, it will turn to the actual analysis of the international agreement. The 
Court, to various degrees will employ a ‘two-tier direct effect test’,
22
 during the course of which it 
looks at the overall nature and objectives of the international agreement and the sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional character of the specific provision being invoked. The Court either 
commences the analysis with the overall nature and objectives of the agreement, in the course of 
which purposive interpretation takes the centre role; or it starts the analysis with the wording of the 
specific provision invoked by the claimant, with textual interpretation dominating the analysis.
23
  
Recent research shows that the Court seems to favour domestic EU policy objectives over 
international obligations
24
 and is keener on enforcing international agreements against Member 
State measures.
25
 Moreover, the Court uses either judicial avoidance techniques or maximalist 
enforcement techniques when faced with the enforcement of certain international agreements.
 26
 In 
case of the GATT,
27




 and the Kyoto Protocol
30
 the nature 
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and structure of these agreements were found not to be able to confer rights on individuals and they 
could not be used as a benchmark for the review of secondary EU law for their compatibility with 
these agreements, even if some of the provisions being relied on were sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional to allow for the creation of individual rights.
31
 Thus, when the Court decides to act in 
a fashion similar to certain national constitutional courts and employs protectionist measures to 
shield EU law and policy from international obligations, the possibility for any type of direct effect, 
be it vertical or horizontal, diminishes. Still, even in horizontal proceedings, the Court will try to a 
great extent to harmonize the interpretation of the domestic norm with the non-directly-effective 
international agreement, in order to protect the rights of private parties.
32
 On the other hand, the 
Court seems to favour maximalist enforcement techniques when confronted with the effects of 
association, partnership and cooperation agreements,
33
 which act as a venue through which the EU 
projects its acquis on applicant or associate countries.
34
 By directly enforcing such agreements, the 
possibility of tension between domestic EU policy objectives and international agreements is low.  
In conclusion, when looking at cases between private parties that involve international 
agreements, it has to be borne in mind that it is not enough to look at the nature of the parties, but 
also the context in which the agreement was concluded,
35
 the different domestic and foreign 
interests involved as well as the policy followed by the Court when enforcing certain agreements. If 
the Court decides that the nature, structure and purpose of an agreement do not allow for direct 
application, then the EU political bodies have to take further steps in order to implement the 
agreement and neither horizontal nor vertical direct effect of the agreement are possible.  
 
b. The obligation contained in a specific provision  
 
The second type of obligation refers to the duties contained in specific provisions of the legal 
instrument, based on which individuals can claim rights. Thus, if the Court concludes that an 
international agreement is capable of direct application, it will need to ask two further questions in 
order to conclude that it can have direct effect between two private parties. First, does the 
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agreement contain obligations which one of the private parties has to carry out? Second, is the other 
private party the beneficiary of the correlative right? 
Answering the first question is not easy as the traditional view is that international agreements 
rarely set forth obligations and provide rights for private parties. Finding provisions which 
specifically address private parties is rare and much of the outcome will depend on the nature and 
type of the international agreement. Take for example the Montreal Convention on international air 
carriage,
36
 which expressly provides a set of unconditional and precise duties of the parties under 
such contracts.
37
 Such an agreement clearly and unconditionally lays down the rights and 
obligations of private parties and it is no wonder that in IATA and ELFAA the Court in one 
paragraph concluded that three articles of the Montreal Convention “appear, as regards their 
content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise” in order to allow for the validity review of acts 
of the EU institutions.
38
 Therefore, acknowledging the HDE of such international agreements 
should not pose a challenge to the Court. 
The first question becomes more difficult to answer when the international agreement is not 
clearly meant to govern private contractual relationships and it becomes difficult to define who 
owes the obligation. For example the former Association Agreement with Slovakia provided in 
Article 38(1) that Slovakian workers “shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality”; 
Article 38(2) then provided that the Slovak Republic “shall” accord the same treatment to Member 
State nationals. These two articles read together seem to suggest that only the contracting States had 
the obligation not to discriminate on grounds of nationality. However, in Kolpak
39
 the Court 
extended this obligation to the German Handball Federation (DHB), a private-law sports 
organization charged with the task of regulating a specific sport. Still, one could argue that this is 
logical as non-discrimination based on nationality should apply to any entity, private or public that 
regulates working conditions. But would the Court extend such a prohibition found in association 
agreements to purely contractual, private party relations? Suppose a private undertaking, not 
controlled by the State or vested with regulatory functions, stipulates in its employment contract 
that it does not hire nationals from the associate country.  
Turning now to the second question, the Court also needs to define the beneficiary of the right 
correlative to the obligation owed by the other private party. This will not pose problems in the case 
of agreements, such as the Montreal Convention, which lay down expressis verbis the rights that 
individuals may enjoy under the agreement. However, what happens when the agreement does not 
mention rights in an express manner? The Court in Van Gend en Loos held that EU rights “arise not 
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only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty [TFEU], but also by reason of obligations 
which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member 
States and upon the institutions of the [EU].”
40
 It seems that when defining the existence of EU 
rights, the Court took a Hohfeldian approach.
41
 Thus, the correlative of an EU duty or obligation is 
an EU right. Because the Treaty imposes obligations on private parties as well as EU institutions 
and Member States, private parties can enjoy the correlative rights to those obligations as against 
other individuals and public institutions. Thus, the TFEU provisions are capable of both horizontal 
and vertical direct effect.
42
 Given that EU international agreements form an ‘integral part’ of EU 
law, they also become a source of EU obligations and correlative EU rights.
43
  
However, the Hohfeldian approach has two drawbacks. First, it does not provide for the 
means of determining who is the beneficiary of the right correlative to an obligation.
44
 Second, 
while rights imply a correlative duty, a duty does not always imply the existence of a correlative 
right.
45
 This is most evident in L’Étang de Berre I,
46
 a case brought by a French fishermen’s 
syndicate, which sought to shut down the operations of a local power plant run by Electricité de 
France (EDF) for its alleged breach of Article 6(3) of the Athens Protocol to the Barcelona 
Convention.
47
 Interestingly, the Court does not mention rights at all in its direct effect analysis
48
 and 
a simple right/duty approach does not seem to provide an answer for why the Court allowed a 
private association to rely on this agreement. The duty was to subject the discharge of certain 
substances to prior authorization, but what was the correlative right? Was it the right to a clean 
environment? And if so, how should one know who is the intended beneficiary of this right? The 
Court offers a hint, that in certain cases a valid interest might suffice, when it states that the 
provisions of the Protocol have direct effect, “so that any interested party is entitled to rely on those 
provisions”.
49
 In the case of directives, Hilson and Downes have already proven that certain 
“effective interests” suffice for the purposes of proving direct effect.
50
 Such interests do not amount 
to rights and are in line with the objectives of the directive, thus enhancing its effet utile.  
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47
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In conclusion the HDE of EU international agreements will depend a lot on knowing whether 
an agreement prescribes obligations to one private party, based on which the other party can claim a 
right or at least which gives rise to an “effective interest”. However, even if an agreement provides 
for such obligations and rights, a lot will depend on the willingness of the Court to consider the 
agreement as directly applicable in the EU legal order. 
 
2. The Second Factor: The Party against Whom the Provision is Invoked 
 
The application of EU law in proceedings between private parties has seen situations which on the 
face of it presented themselves as horizontal, but in reality one of the private parties enjoyed certain 
prerogatives and functions similar to that of the State. In an effort to bridge the gap between the 
application of the ‘free movement of persons’ provisions of the TFEU to private parties
51
 and the 
application of EU competition rules to Member State conduct,
52
 the Court turned away from the old 
private/public law distinction, and favoured an approach based on the nature of the functions carried 
out by the entity.
53
 The Court also tried to remedy the lack of HDE of directives, by introducing the 
‘emanation of the State’ doctrine,
54
 indirect effect, or by granting HDE to general principles of EU 
law to which directives gave expression.
55
 With this in mind, the following sections will group the 
existing cases concerning the effects of EU international agreements in proceedings between private 
parties, according to the nature of the passive party and the functions it carries out, as well as the 
source of law to which HDE is granted.  
 
a. Private Party v. an ‘Emanation of the State’  
 
Over the years the Court has gradually expanded the scope ratione personae of the EU Treaties and 
secondary EU legislation. In order to obtain the uniform application of EU law, the obligation to 
give full effect to the Treaties and secondary EU legislation was not confined to the Member State 





 the Court laid down a set of criteria, based both on functional factors as well 
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as the control exercised by the State, under which a specific body “whatever its legal form”
58
 can be 
classified as an ‘emanation of the State’.
59
 It held that a sufficiently precise and unconditional 
provision of a directive can be relied on against a body, regardless of its form, which has been set 
up pursuant to State measures in order to provide a public service under the control of the State and 
has for that purpose special powers, beyond those applicable to private relations.
60
  
Turning now to international agreements, in the previously discussed L’Étang de Berre I, the 
Court gave direct effect to Article 6(3) of the Athens Protocol. At a first glance this case might 
present itself as the recognition of the HDE of a provision found in an EU international agreement, 
since it concerned a claim brought by a French association of fishermen against EDF, an energy 
company. However, as mentioned, the quality of the party against whom a legal norm is invoked 
plays an important role in the HDE debate. In this case, the defendant electricity company could be 
seen as an emanation of the French State at the time the judgment was handed down. Up until 19 
November 2004 (the judgment was handed down on 15 July 2004) EDF was a state-owned 
corporation.
61
 It was furthermore in the privileged position of enjoying a national service, through 
an agreement with the French Government,
62
 and its facilities near the L’Étang de Berre marshland 
were not only meant to generate electricity at a regional level, but also to contribute to the security 
of electricity generation.
63
 In other words EDF constituted an ‘emanation’ of the French State and 
the relationship between the fishermen’s syndicate and the undertaking cannot be regarded as truly 
horizontal.  
Still, it is peculiar that nowhere in the judgment does the Court discuss the emanation of the 
State doctrine, makes no reference to such cases like Foster and neither does it expressly mention 
HDE. This might signal the unwillingness of the Court to create a parallel between the HDE of 
directives and the HDE of international agreements, including its case-law on the ‘emanation of the 
State’ doctrine. Such a choice is understandable since the ‘emanation of the State’ doctrine was 
developed in the specific context of providing an exception to the no-HDE of directives. Extending 
this exception to EU international agreements would imply that such agreements, just as directives, 
are also generally precluded from having HDE. However, as previously discussed, no such rule 
exists concerning EU international agreements (See Part III). Another explanation might be that the 
Court is known to only answer the questions which are specifically referred to it, when a case 
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comes before it in the form of a preliminary reference. In L’Étang de Berre I the national court 
raised a question concerning the direct effect of Article 6(3) of the Protocol, but did not refer any 
questions regarding HDE or the ‘emanation of the State’ doctrine;
64
 neither did the Court find it 
necessary to address this issue. Whatever the reasons might be, this case illustrates that an 
international agreement can have direct effect in a case brought by a private association against a 
company, which is owned and controlled by the State. 
 
b. Professional v. a Private Regulatory Body of a Profession 
 
It is not uncommon that many professions in different fields, such as sports or the profession of 
attorney are regulated by private bodies. Besides private regulatory bodies, certain Member States 
also allow the social partners to reach collective agreements that regulate remuneration, conditions 
of employment, etc. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions trade unions are allowed to organize 
collective actions.
65
 The Court over the years took into consideration these realities and adopted a 
‘functional’ approach, through which it extended the free movement of persons articles of the 




 national bar associations,
68
 and 
collective actions taken by trade unions.
69
 More recently, the Court held that a private body 
entrusted with the certification of certain goods can also restrict the free movement of goods.
70
 
With regard to EU international agreements, most cases involving a private party and a private 
regulatory body arose in the last decade, with one exception. In Razanatsimba
71
 a Madagascan 
national relied on Article 62 of the Lomé Convention in order to challenge a rule adopted by the 
Lille Bar, which restricted the access of non-French nationals, even if the law degree was obtained 
in France. Interestingly, the Court did not discuss the direct effect of the agreement, but simply 
went on to interpret the relevant provision and came to the conclusion that the wording contained an 
exception to the rule on equal treatment in matters of establishment. Thus, the international 
provision did not “purport to provide equality of treatment” between the nationals of the signatory 
parties.
72
 This case is part of a set of cases in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s in which the Court 
provided an interpretation of the relevant international provisions, but did not discuss their direct 
effect (See Part II.2.c).
73
 One explanation for this silence might be that neither did the national 
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courts ask about, nor did the Advocate Generals discuss, the direct effect of the international 
agreements. Therefore, the Court preferred to confine itself to these parameters.
74
 This case also 
illustrates that direct effect is not always needed in order for a private professional to rely on the 
provisions of an international agreement in a case against a private regulatory body; the direct effect 
question can be left aside by referring a question on the substantive interpretation of a specific 
provision of the EU international agreement.   
Looking at more recent years, in Kolpak, a Slovakian national (before accession) relied on 
Article 38(1) of the Association Agreement with Slovakia, relating to non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality as regards the working conditions, remuneration and dismissal of Slovakian 
nationals. He sought to challenge the “federal regulations”
75
 laid down by the German Handball 
Federation (DHB), which restricted the number of non-EU players. The Court granted the 
international provision direct effect by first looking at the wording of the specific provision being 
relied on and only in a secondary manner, taking into consideration the objectives of the agreement 
and the context in which its provisions were adopted.
76
 The Court then drew a parallel with the 
Bosman
77
 case, in which it held that the prohibition of discrimination against working conditions 
applies also to rules laid down by sports associations.
78
 According to the Court, the realities of 
certain professions have to be taken into consideration, the regulation of which is not restricted to 
rules enacted by public authorities.
79
 The last argument dealt with the scope of the 
non-discrimination principle set down by the association agreement. Contrary to the objections of 
the DHB and several governments, the Court held that the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality applied in the case, because it referred to equal working conditions, once the foreign 
nationals were legally employed in a Member State.
80
  
Several observations are needed. First, it is remarkable that the Court drew a parallel between 
Bosman, concerning the direct effect of provisions of the TFEU, and the direct effect of an EU 
international agreement. As seen in the previous section, the Court avoided such parallels when the 
‘emanation of the State’ doctrine was concerned. One explanation might be that the general rule for 
directives is the lack of HDE, and the emanation of the State doctrine is a specific exception to this 
rule. On the other hand, no general rule exists prohibiting the HDE of provisions of the TFEU or 
EU international agreements, which rank above EU directives. Another explanation might be that 
this case involved free movement provisions and the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality. Knowing the importance of this principle in the overall EU acquis and given that part of 
this acquis was exported through the Europe Agreements, the Court might have been more willing 
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to enforce these provisions.
81
 Second, the Court took into account the ‘realities’ of sporting 
professions, which often exhibit a sort of dependency
82
 between sports professionals and sports 
federations enjoying quasi-State regulatory functions. If the Court were to follow a strict approach 
based on the public or the private law character of a rule-making entity, private parties could be 
denied the right to challenge the measures of private regulatory bodies, simply because of their 
private law character. Instead, the Court favours a functional approach based on the tasks and 
responsibilities carried out by regulatory bodies. Third, these situations cannot be classified as truly 
horizontal, but exhibit more the characteristics of quasi-vertical direct effect. In other words, 
whenever Bosman-type direct effect occurs, caution should be taken before concluding that actual 
HDE was granted. 
Whilst one might think that such a positive outcome was also partially due to the agreement’s 
ultimate objective of accession, the Court followed a similar approach in a case involving a 
cooperation agreement, which did not set accession to the EU among its goals. In Simutenkov
83
 a 
Russian football player legally employed by a Spanish football team relied on the 
non-discrimination provision of the EC-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in order to 
challenge a rule of the Royal Spanish Football Federation, which restricted the number of non-EU 
players. Compared to the Europe Agreements,
84
 the agreement with Russia set a more modest 
agenda. It too contained a provision (Article 23(1)) on equal treatment for Russian nationals legally 
employed in the territory of the Member States. However, Article 27 of the Agreement provided 
that the implementation of this article would be done through recommendations made by the 
Cooperation Council, set up by the agreement. Contrary to what some might have expected, this 
provision did not affect the Court’s reasoning.  
The Court commenced the direct effect analysis by first looking at the wording, purpose and 
nature of the agreement.
85
 According to the Court the wording of the specific provisions were clear, 
precise and unconditional on the prohibition of discrimination.
86
 Next, the Court succinctly argued 
that Article 27 of the Cooperation Agreement did not make the applicability of Article 23 in its 
implementation and effects subject to the adoption of any subsequent measures.
87
 This latter 
argument of the Court seems to be at odds with Demirel in which one of the factors for denying 
direct applicability to the Ankara Agreement was the need to implement the free movement 
provisions of the agreement through the decisions of the Council of Association.
88
 The Court then 
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looked at the objective of the agreement, which was to set up a partnership for promoting the 
development of trade and political ties between the parties as well as the “gradual integration” of 
Russia.
89
 The fact that the Agreement was limited to establishing a partnership, “without providing 
for an association or future accession” could not prevent the provisions from having direct effect.
90
 
 At a first glance it seems strange that the Court offers the same treatment to a partnership 
agreement as it offers to Europe Agreements, knowing that the former does not set out such 
ambitious goals as the possible accession to the EU. However, a closer look at how the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
 91
 is carried out shows that the pre-accession methodology is not only 
used to prepare countries for EU membership but it is now extensively relied upon to transform the 
eastern and southern neighbours into a “ring of EU friends”.
92
 Even though the agreement with 
Russia was signed before the creation of the ENP and Russia is currently not included in the ENP, a 
lot of the objectives and methods
93
 used in the EC-Russia agreement were the same as the ones used 
in the Europe Agreements.
94
 Thus, partnership agreements also serve as a means of channelling the 
EU acquis towards States which are not potential EU candidates, and a favourable direct effect 
ruling will not create significant tensions between the policies pursued by the EU’s political 
institutions and the objectives of the partnership agreements. Moreover, the case also involved the 
non-discrimination principle based on nationality, which as mentioned, takes a prominent role in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Furthermore, just as in the case of Kolpak, it seems difficult to argue that 
true HDE occurred, since the case involved the rules enacted by the regulatory body of the football 
profession. It seems more logical to argue that quasi-vertical direct effect was involved. 
More recently in Kahveci,
95
 a Turkish national and a Spanish football team relied on 
Article 37 of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which prohibits discrimination as 
regards working conditions and remuneration in order to challenge a rule of the Spanish Royal 
Football Federation. Contrary to the previous two cases, the Court first interpreted the 
non-discrimination provision and only afterwards did it discuss its direct effect. Reiterating Kolpak 
and Simutenkov, the Court held that the provisions on non-discrimination found in such association 
and partnership agreements prohibit in “clear, precise and unconditional terms” discrimination 
between Member State and non-Member State nationals as regards working conditions, 
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 Moreover, this prohibition of discrimination was in line with the 
purpose of the Ankara Agreement, which allowed for the recognition of its direct effect.
97
  
Interestingly, even though the case concerned the Ankara Agreement, the Court did not refer 
to any of the prior cases concerning this Agreement. In Demirel the Agreement was denied direct 
effect mainly due to its programmatic nature, which required the Council of Association to lay 
down detailed rules for the progressive attainment of freedom of movement.
98
 Later on in Sevince,
99
 
the Court partially remedied Demirel by holding that the decisions of the Association Council were 
capable of “direct application”.
100
 Several explanations might exist for the Court’s silence in 
Kahveci on these prior cases. First, Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council 
also contained a provision on non-discrimination drafted in similar words as Article 37 of the 
Additional Protocol and Association Council Decisions are capable of having direct effect. 
However, the Court argued that the article of the Additional Protocol, a part of the Agreement, had 
direct effect
101
 and it did not refer to the direct effect of the Association Council’s Decision. Second, 
this case seems to signal the maturity of the Court’s approach to the direct effect of the Ankara 
Agreement. In the post-Sevince era, the Court did not bother anymore to analyse the object and 
purpose of the Ankara Agreement. When faced with the interpretation of a specific provision, it 




With the above in mind the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the willingness of the 
Court to grant direct effect to these different international provisions may be explained by the 
importance of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Second, the Court was willing to extend its Bosman holding, concerned with the direct effect of 
primary EU law, to EU international agreements. Third, the Court favours following a functional 
approach, even when EU international agreements are concerned. Thus, the determining factor in 
the vertical/horizontal debate is the regulatory function exercised by the entity and not the entities’ 
private or public law character. In other words, these cases cannot be seen as a confirmation of 
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c. Private Undertaking vs. Private Undertaking 
 
Another situation concerns proceedings which arise between two private parties,
103
 situated at an 
equal level of hierarchy with none of them exercising State-like or regulatory functions. Even in 
such circumstances, whether HDE occurred is questionable.   
With regard to EU international agreements two such cases were handed down over three 
decades ago, which arose between private traders, but the Court did not discuss the agreements’ 
HDE. In Cayrol v Rivoira,
104
 an Italian court referred a set of questions to the Court on the 
interpretation of various provisions on quantitative restrictions found in the Agreement between the 
EEC and Spain, regarding a dispute that arose between two traders over a consignment of 
fraudulently labelled Spanish grapes.
105
 It is interesting to note that the referring national court did 
not in any way include a question on the direct effect of the agreement, and the Court did not tackle 
the issue of direct effect. Instead it went on to interpret Article 11 of the Annex to the Agreement, 
and favoured the narrower interpretation suggested by the Commission as it was “more in 
accordance with both the general scheme and the objectives of the Agreement”.
106
 As mentioned 
earlier, this case is part of a line of cases including Razanatsimba, in which the Court does not 
discuss direct effect, but prefers to interpret the international provision in question. 
Several years later in Polydor,
107
 the Court was faced with a dispute that arose between two 
record companies regarding the parallel import of a popular Bee Gees album into the United 
Kingdom from Portugal, which was not yet an EU member. Interestingly, even though the referring 
national court specifically asked about the direct enforceability of Article 14(2) of the EEC-Portugal 
Agreement by private parties,
108
 the Court followed a similar approach to the one in 
Cayrol v. Rivoira and did not tackle the direct effect question. Instead, it looked at whether the said 
conduct could amount to a measure having an equivalent effect under the Agreement, as under EC 
law prevention of a parallel import from another Member State constituted a measure having 
equivalent effect.
109
 Even though the wording of the relevant provisions of the Agreement was 
similar to those of the EEC Treaty, the Court did not find this similarity to be a “sufficient reason” 
for transposing to the agreement the existing EC case-law.
110
 The main argument was that the 
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Agreement and the EEC pursued different objectives and the Agreement did not have the same 
purpose as the EEC treaty.
111
 
With the above in mind, several observations are warranted. First, whether HDE actually 
occurred is debatable. One might argue that the mere fact that the parties were allowed to invoke the 
agreement, even though no discussion on direct effect was present, already constitutes direct effect. 
However, it seems that the Court avoided the direct effect question altogether and instead preferred 
to interpret the relevant international provisions. Such an approach might come as an aid to private 
parties. Direct effect can either function as a ‘sword’, by allowing the foreign norm to penetrate the 
domestic legal order or it can function as a ‘shield’, and protect domestic policy interests.
112
 By not 
tackling the direct effect question, the Court circumvents the possibility that the lack of direct effect 
might stop private parties from reaching their goal.  
Second, both Cayrol and Polydor, as well as Razanatsimba appeared in a period of a five year 
long silence on direct effect, following the Court’s judgment in Bresciani,
113
 in which it granted 
direct effect to the Second Yaoundé Convention.
114
 This silence then ended several months after 
Polydor, when the Court affirmed the direct effect of the Agreement with Greece in Pabst
115
 and 
the Agreement with Portugal in the textbook case of Kupferberg.
116
 One explanation to this silence 
might be that following Bresciani the Court was wary to extend the direct effect of EU international 
agreements beyond vertical situations. This was a time when Defrenne II
117
 and the HDE of the 
EEC Treaty had barely been affirmed and Marshall
118
 and the no-HDE of directives were not yet 
born. In this context it would have been too ambitious for the Court to clearly confirm the HDE of 
EU international agreements. Both Pabst and Kupferberg point in this direction; the Court 
reaffirmed direct effect since both cases presented vertical situations and not horizontal ones. 
Third, these cases belong to a set of cases in which the Court did not want to extend the EU 
interpretation of barriers to free trade to similarly worded provisions of free trade agreements, even 
if in later cases it has done so.
119
 The fourth observation is influenced by certain arguments used in 
the US. In US legal literature and federal court cases it has been argued that the self-executing 
character of a ‘treaty’ need not be proven, when the agreement is relied on by the defendant as a 
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 Whether such an argument would hold in Europe is difficult to say, but in both cases the 
agreements were invoked by the defendants in their defence.
121
  
Fifth, in Faccini Dori
122
 the Court held that by granting direct effect to directives in relations 
between private parties, a new power of the EU would be recognised to enact obligations for 
individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to do so only where it is empowered 
to adopt regulations.
123
 By allowing private parties to rely on international agreements against other 
private parties, it seems that in some contexts such a power now appears possible via EU 




d. Direct effect is granted to a general EU principle, but not the legal instrument   
 




 the Court has shown that even though directives 
do not have HDE, in case they “gave expression”
127
 to a general principle of EU law 
(non-discrimination on grounds of age), the general principle can have HDE. Some authors argue 
that the Court makes a fairly artificial distinction between the effects of directives and the effects 
given to directives which give expression to general principles.
128
 Other authors have observed that 
only a relative few principles will meet the triple threshold needed in order for the Kücükdeveci 
doctrine to apply.
129
 The Court gave a new twist to this doctrine in the very recent AMS
130
  
judgment, faced with a set of questions referred by the French Cour de Cassation on the effects of 
Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in a dispute between private parties. The 
Court looked at whether Article 27 of the Charter could be applied horizontally in a similar fashion 
as the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age was applied in Kücükdeveci.
131
 Contrary to 
what some might have expected, the Court concluded that the ‘right’
132
 enshrined in Article 27 of 
the Charter and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age were different. Whilst the 
latter principle was “sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may 
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 Article 27 of the Charter could only be fully effective if it was given “more 
specific expression” in EU and national law.
134
 The Court thus concluded that Article 27 of the 
Charter could not apply in proceedings between private parties.  
Whilst, this judgment is meant to enhance legal certainty as to the horizontal application of 
EU law, it also raises new questions such as which fundamental rights/principles of EU law are 
“legally perfect” to grant rights to individuals and how is that to be determined?
135
 This means that 
certain provisions found in international agreements, which reflect a general principle of EU law, 
might be capable of HDE if they are legally perfect, but other provisions which encapsulate such 
general principles might not be capable of operating without being given further expression by EU 
or Member State law. These cases also make a potential reader ask the question, whether a specific 
legal instrument was granted HDE or whether a general principle of EU law, which the legal 
instrument gives expression to, enjoyed such effect.  
In the field of international agreements, Kolpak, Kahveci and Simutenkov all concerned the 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality and one could argue that it was this principle 
that was granted direct effect and not the international agreements. However, such a conclusion is 
unwarranted for several reasons. First, principles in general have a gap-filling function and will 
only be relied on when a written legal rule contains certain lacunae.
136
 The relevant association and 
partnership agreements all contained the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. 
Whilst it is true that the directives in Mangold and Kücükdeveci also contained a general principle 
of EU law, the Court resorted to the afore-mentioned mechanism due to the no-HDE rule of 
directives. However, in the case of international agreements no such rule exists. Thus, it seems 
pointless to grant HDE to a general principle when the legal instrument in which it is contained has 
the possibility to have HDE. Second, whilst Article 18 TFEU contains the general prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, it is only relevant within the ‘scope of application’ of 
the TFEU.
137
 Compared to the ambitious objectives of the Treaties, most international agreements 
pursue more modest aims.
138
 Thus, just because a principle is contained in an international 
agreement, which is similar to an EU principle, does not yet mean that it will be given the same 
meaning. Razanatsimba has shown that the scope of the non-discrimination principle found in 
association, partnership or free trade agreements can be different than the scope of the similar 
principle in the EU context.  Moreover, the Bananas case
139
 concerning the preferential tariffs 
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applied to banana imports coming from ACP countries is a good example that the EU institutions 





III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE SHY TO CONFIRM IT  
 
1. Reasons behind the Court’s ‘shyness’ 
 
Based on the analysis provided in Part II some interesting observations can be made. It seems that 
the Court is not willing to make any express statements on the HDE of EU international 
agreements, but prefers a cautious, almost case-by-case approach. The ‘emanation of the State’ 
doctrine is an exception specifically created in order to circumvent the general rule on the lack of 
HDE of directives. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Court in L’Étang de Berre I was not willing 
to mingle the issues concerning this exception with the direct enforcement of an international 
agreement against a state owned and controlled company. Instead, it preferred to simply grant direct 
effect to the agreement without stirring up a full-fledged debate on whether exceptions applying to 
the no-HDE of directives should be applied to the direct effect of EU international agreements. 
The Court, however, made a surprising move in Kolpak and applied the Bosman doctrine to a 
Europe Agreement. As previously mentioned, such a result is explainable, since the principle of 
non-discrimination based on nationality holds a prominent position in the Court’s case-law and 
association agreements are a venue through which the EU acquis is exported. However, the 
willingness to extend the Bosman-type of direct effect from the Founding Treaties to EU 
international agreements might be a sign that, unlike in the case of the hierarchically inferior EU 
directives, there is no general prohibition regarding the HDE of EU international agreements. This 
conclusion is in line with the conclusions reached in Part II.1. The no-HDE of directives was a 
result of Article 288 TFEU and the obligation of the Member States to transpose directives. 
However, no such general obligation exists under EU primary law for the EU institutions and the 
Member States to transpose binding international agreements into their legal orders. 
Still these cases do not present themselves as veritable horizontal relationships. They involved 
private actors which were either owned and controlled by the State, or exercised quasi-State 
regulatory functions. True horizontal relationships involve private parties at equal hierarchical 
positions, carrying out similar functions and are mostly concerned with private contractual 
relationships. Polydor and Cayrol both involved such veritable horizontal relationships, but the 
Court shied away from expressly confirming HDE. As explained, this outcome is also 
understandable, since the Court was asked to deliver these judgments in a time, when the HDE of 
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different internal EU legal instruments was not yet fully settled. It would have been too risky for the 
Court to confirm the HDE of EU international agreements in such delicate times. 
Some suggestions, however, are offered to the Court to finally, clearly acknowledge the HDE 
of international agreements. It is time to leave behind this apparent shyness.   
 
2. Time to move on 
 
As discussed, L’Étang de Berre I and the Bosman-type direct effect are not a result of veritable 
horizontal relationships, even though the Court has confirmed such quasi-vertical direct effect. 
However, the Polydor and Cayrol type of horizontal relationships are still in need of an express 
confirmation of HDE. The times have moved on since the late ‘70s and early ‘80s and by now the 
Court has consolidated the EU legal order as a separate legal order, with its own internal 
constitutional mechanisms. Now we know that certain articles of the Founding Treaties and 
regulations can have HDE. The no-HDE of directives has especially seen an intricate array of 
exceptions and alternatives attached to it. Moreover, the Court has consolidated the primacy of 
international agreements, and has been fairly generous in granting direct effect to most international 
agreements, with notable exceptions. I am of the opinion that in this new legal climate, 
acknowledging direct effect in veritable horizontal relationships would not stir up too much 
opposition from Member States or EU institutions. After all, the private, mainly contractual 
relations between private parties with equal functions would not touch upon the policies and powers 
of government actors. A good example for this would be the Montreal Convention, to which the 
Court in IATA and ELFAA has already granted vertical direct effect, without causing any 
controversies.  
 
3. Other jurisdictions do not seem to have a problem with it 
 
This section is meant to provide an example of how other major and complex jurisdictions (mainly 
the United States) apply international agreements in proceedings between private parties, in order to 
prove that the application of such agreements in horizontal proceedings do not cause particular 
problems to courts. Therefore, the Court should not hesitate to expressly acknowledge the HDE of 
EU international agreements. 
Recent research focusing on the domestic application of international agreements in a dozen 
countries has shown that domestic courts are more willing to directly apply treaty provisions that 
regulate relationships between private actors, because they do not create significant new duties for 
governments. However, they are less willing to do so when international agreements regulate 
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vertical situations, because such agreements implicate the public functions of government.
141
 In a 
different study, Professor Nollkaemper found that courts are willing to apply international 
agreements in horizontal proceedings, even in countries in which vertical direct effect of an 
international agreement is a “non-starter”. For example, in Lu v. United States Inc, a Shanghai court 
applied the Warsaw Convention in horizontal proceedings.
142
 As he notes, domestic courts will 
routinely enforce mainly private international law governing interactions between private persons, 
such as the Treaty Establishing the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa 
or the International Convention on the Sale of Goods (CISG).
143
 
Looking at the US, a system that directly incorporates international agreements (treaties) in its 
legal order,
144
 the following can be said. Even though the Supreme Court
145
 and federal courts
146
 
have been favouring protectionist measures for the past decades in cases which involve 
international agreements, the situation is more nuanced. Recent empirical research has shown that 
in private party proceedings, opposed to vertical proceedings against the government, US courts are 
a lot more willing to apply tools that enhance treaty enforcement, such as the cannon of good faith, 
liberal interpretation or holding that the treaty is self-executing. The Supreme Court has 
successfully applied different types of international agreements, such as the Warsaw Convention,
147
 
the Shipowner’s Liability Convention
148
 and the FCN Treaty between the US and Japan,
149
 in 
proceedings between private parties. On the other hand, in vertical proceedings there is a higher 
incidence of protectionist techniques, such as the presumption against judicially enforceable rights 
or holding that a treaty is non-self-executing.
150
 In private party proceedings there was also a 
significantly higher percentage of cases in which the party invoking the international agreement 
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won the case. The explanation lies in the interest involved in such cases. In private party 
proceedings the risk of creating friction between the objectives of an international agreement and 
the domestic objectives of the legislative and the executive is fairly small. However, in cases when 
private parties challenge government action, the potential friction between international obligations 
and domestic policy objectives is a lot higher and courts will favour protectionist measures.
151
 The 
same holds true for the EU as well, as the Court is known to sometimes favour domestic EU policy 
objectives over international obligations.
152
 A further explanation for the willingness of US courts 
to apply international agreements to proceedings between private parties could be that the US does 
not have a legal instrument similar to EU directives, which in the EU caused most of the 
controversies surrounding the application of EU norms in proceedings between private parties. As 
explained, this might be one of the reasons for the apparent reluctance of the Court to clearly 




The title of this article asked whether the Court is avoiding a clear statement on the HDE of EU 
international agreements. The answer has to be a nuanced one.  
The Court has affirmed the Bosman-type quasi-vertical direct effect of provisions found in EU 
international agreements relating to free movement and non-discrimination based on nationality. It 
was, however, not willing to start a debate on whether the ‘emanation of the State’ doctrine could 
be applied to EU international agreements. It simply confirmed direct effect without causing much 
fuss. So it can be concluded that EU international agreements can have direct effect in proceedings 
between private individuals/professionals and private regulatory bodies of a profession or a private 
entity owned and controlled by the State. On the other hand, the Court was faced with veritable 
horizontal situations in a time when it was not the most opportune moment to confirm the HDE of 
international agreements. Whilst this approach is understandable, given the specific historical 
context, the time has come to move on and clearly confirm HDE in such situations as well. As we 
have seen, other jurisdictions, which in general are adverse towards the vertical direct effect of 
international agreements, apply such agreements in veritable horizontal proceedings. The main 
explanation is that such cases involve the provisions of international agreements which create rights 
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and obligations between private parties. Therefore, they do not imply the public functions of the 
government, and no potential friction is created between the judiciary and the political bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
